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Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept
in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that
they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents
are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple
network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support
for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.
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yE-mail addresses: marco.mantovani@unimi.it (Marco Mantovani), gkirchst@ulb.ac.be (Georg
Kirchsteiger), mauleon@fusl.ac.be (Ana Mauleon), vincent.vannetelbosch@uclouvain.be (Vincent
Vannetelbosch).1 Introduction
The network structure of social interactions inuences a variety of behaviors and
economic outcomes, including the formation of opinions, decisions on which products
to buy, investment in education, access to jobs, and informal borrowing and lending.
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long
run is to examine the requirement that individuals do not benet from altering the
structure of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise stability
notion dened by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if
no individual benets from severing one of her links and no two individuals benet
from adding a link between them, with one beneting strictly and the other at least
weakly. Pairwise stability is a myopic denition. Individuals are not farsighted in
the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Indeed,
the adding or severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or severing of
another link. If individuals foresee how others react to changes in the network, then
one wants to allow for this in the denition of the stability concept. For instance,
individuals might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the current
network, as that might induce the formation of other links, ultimately leading to
lower payos for the original individuals.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have proposed the notion of pairwise
farsightedly stable sets of networks that predicts which networks one might expect
to emerge in the long run when individuals are farsighted.1 A set of networks G is
pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network
g 2 G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse o or
equally well o, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network
outside the set leading to some network in the set,2 and (iii) if there is no proper
1Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Chwe
(1994), Xue (1998), Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2004), Page, Wooders and Kamat (2005), Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005), and Page and Wooders
(2009).
2A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or
sever links based on the improvement the end network oers relative to the current network. Each
network in the sequence diers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two
players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the
two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of
the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network.
1subset of G satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly
stable set always exists. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have provided
a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. They
have shown that farsightedness can rene pairwise stability by selecting the Pareto
ecient network among the pairwise stable ones. For instance, they have found
that in the criminal network model of Calv o-Armengol and Zenou (2004), the set
consisting of the complete network (where all criminals are linked to each other) is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set that selects the Pareto ecient network. Grandjean,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2011) have shown that in the Kranton and Minehart
(2001) model of buyer-seller networks, pairwise farsighted stability may even sustain
the strongly ecient network while pairwise stability sustains networks that are
strongly inecient or even Pareto dominated.
Based on the characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of net-
works of Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009), we dene a network g to be
pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if there is no farsighted improving path leaving g
and (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any other network leading
to g. This second condition implies that a pairwise farsightedly stable network is
robust to perturbations.3 When a pairwise farsightedly stable network g exists, it is
the unique one, it is pairwise stable, it belongs to the largest pairwise consistent set
(see Chwe, 1994), and the set fgg coincides with the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set and the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable
set (see Chwe, 1994). Note that the notion of farsightedness has the avor of a focal
point notion. Compared to other stable networks, players realize that all of them
could be better o by establishing a farsighted stable network (if it exists), although
creating it might require the formation of links that do not immediately benet the
two agents connected by it. So farsighted stability could be viewed as a coordination
device. This focal point property is of course reinforced by the uniqueness of the
pairwise farsighted stable network.
There is a subtle connection between notions of pairwise stability (PWS) and
farsighted stability (FS). In particular, a FS network is always PWS, but not the
other way round. Hence, FS can be viewed as a renement of PWS. But the un-
3There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on incentives to
form links such as Watts (2002), Jackson and Watts (2002), and Tercieux and Vannetelosch (2006).
These models aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks.
2derlying behavioral assumptions of both notions - myopia versus farsightedness -
are at odds with each other. In our paper we test these types of behaviors in the
context of network formation. Network formation is hard to study in the eld, as
many potentially conicting factors are at work. Consequently, we run laboratory
experiments. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the rst experimental
test of farsightedness versus myopia in network formation.
In the experiment, groups of four subjects had to form a network. More speci-
cally, they were allowed sequentially to add or sever one link at a time: a link was
chosen at random and the agents involved in the link had to decide if they wanted to
form it (if it had not been formed yet) or to sever it (if it had been already formed).
The process was repeated until all group members declared they were satised with
the existing network. The payos were designed such that a group consisting of my-
opic agents would never form any link, while a group composed of farsighted agents
would form the complete network which was of course FS. The results supported
FS and strongly rejected the hypothesis of myopic behavior both at the group and
at the individual level. More than 70 percent of the subjects were farsighted and a
similar percentage of the experienced groups reached the FS network, while only 7
percent of the sample displayed behaviors consistent with myopia.
The number of experiments addressing networks and network formation is rapidly
increasing.4 Relatively few of them, however, deal with pure network formation, in-
tended as a setting where no strategic interactions take place on the network once it
has been formed. Among the notable exceptions stand the experiments of Goeree,
Riedl and Ule (2009) and Falk and Kosfeld (2003). They investigate the predictive
power of a strict Nash network in the framework of Bala and Goyal (2000). They
nd low support for this concept when the Nash network is asymmetric and the
agents homogeneous. The main dierence with our design is that they consider a
model with unilateral link formation and apply non-cooperative solution concepts,
while in our context of bilateral link formation those concepts provide implausible
predictions (see Bloch and Jackson, 2006).
Closer to our approach is the work of Pantz and Ziegelmeyer (2008), where R&D
networks in a Cournot oligopoly are investigated. Their results generally support
pairwise stability. In their design pairwise stable networks are also farsightedly
4See Kosfeld (2004) for a partial survey.
3stable and thus there is no tension between myopia and farsightedness.5
The only experiment on network formation that addresses in some way farsight-
edness, to the best of our knowledge, is the one by Berninghaus, Ehrhart and Ott
(2008). The authors argue they nd evidence of a kind of limited farsightedness,
which they use to build the concept of one-step-ahead stability. Relevant features
distinguish our work from their model: (i) they assume unilateral link formation;
(ii) players play a coordination game on the endogenously formed network and thus
the assumption on the beliefs about this latter game aects the predictions; (iii) the
farsightedness notion they consider relates specically to the interaction between the
linking strategies and the strategies in the coordination game. So their experiment
combines a test of network formation and strategic behavior in the coordination
game, while our paper is the rst to directly investigate farsightedness and myopia
in a network formation context unaected by any other considerations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we introduce the necessary no-
tation and denitions. Section II presents the experimental design and procedures.
Section III reports the experimental results. Section IV concludes.
2 Networks: notation and denitions
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the nite set of players who are connected in some net-
work relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus
modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links
indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply
a list of which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij 2 g to
indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. Let gN be the collection of
all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so gN is the complete network. The set of all
possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of gN.
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij
and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g is
denoted g   ij.
5They observe huge dierences between the case in which the Cournot prots are considered
as exogenously given and identied with the payos of the players in the network, and the case in
which players play the production stage after forming the network. This supports pure network
formation as the cleanest setting to study network formation.
4The material payos associated to a network are represented by a function x :
G ! Rn where xi(g) represents the material payo that player i obtains in network
g. The overall benet net of costs that a player enjoys from a network g is modeled
by means of a utility function ui(g) : Rn ! R that associates a value to the vector
of material payos associated to network g . This might include all sorts of costs,
benets, and externalities. Given a permutation of players  and any g 2 G, let
g = f(i)(j) j ij 2 gg. Thus, g is a network that is identical to g up to a
permutation of the players. We say that the function of material payos satisfy
anonymity if, for every g 2 G and permutation , x(i)(g) = xi(g). Anonymity
ensures that the labels of the agents do not matter.
Let Ni(g) = fj j ij 2 gg be the set of nodes that i is linked to in network g. The
degree of a node is the number of links that involve that node. Thus node i's degree in
a network g, denoted di(g), is di(g) = #Ni(g). Let Sk(g) be the subset of nodes that
have degree k in network g: Sk(g) = fi 2 N j di(g) = kg with k 2 f0;1;:::;n   1g.
The degree distribution of a network g is a description of the relative frequencies of
nodes that have dierent degrees. That is, P(k) is the fraction of nodes that have
degree k under a degree distribution P; that is P(k) = (#Sk(g))=n. Given a degree
distribution, P, we dene a class of networks as CP = fg 2 G j P(k) = P(k);8kg.
A class of networks is the subset of G with the same degree distribution.
Consider a network formation process under which mutual consent is needed to
form a link and link deletion is unilateral. A network is pairwise stable if no player
benets from severing one of their links and no other two players benet from adding
a link between them, with one beneting strictly and the other at least weakly.
Formally, a network g is pairwise stable if
(i) for all ij 2 g, ui(g)  ui(g   ij) and uj(g)  uj(g   ij), and
(ii) for all ij = 2 g, if ui(g) < ui(g + ij) then uj(g) > uj(g + ij).
We say that g0 is adjacent to g if g0 = g+ij or g0 = g ij for some ij. A network
g0 defeats g if either g0 = g ij and ui(g0) > ui(g) or uj(g0) > uj(g), or if g0 = g+ij
with ui(g0)  ui(g) and uj(g0)  uj(g) with at least one inequality holding strictly.
Pairwise stability is equivalent to the statement of not being defeated by another
(adjacent) network.
Agents are assumed to consider only their own incentives when making their
linking choices and not that of the others. In particular, agents do not take into
5account the likely chain of reactions that follow an action, but only its immediate
protability. Thus, PWS implily assumes myopic behavior on the part of the agents.
We now dene myopic behavior. At time t the link ij is selected, the action of
agent i is at
i 2 f0;1g, where 0 means not to form (to break) the selected link ij, and
1 means to form (to keep) the link ij.
Denition 1. An action at
i is myopic if:
(i) whenever ij = 2 gt 1, then at
i =
(
1 if ui(gt 1 + ij)  ui(gt 1)
0 otherwise,
(ii) whenever ij 2 gt 1, then at
i =
(
0 if ui(gt 1   ij) > ui(gt 1)
1 otherwise.
Myopic behavior only looks at the protability of adjacent networks.
We now dene farsighted behavior. Farsightedness captures the idea that agents
will consider the chain of reactions that could follow when deviating from the cur-
rent network, and evaluate the protability of such deviation with reference to the
nal network of the chain of reactions. As a consequence, a farsighted agent will
eventually choose against her immediate interest if she believes that the sequence of
reactions that will follow her action could make her better o.
A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when
players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network oers relative
to the current network. Each network in the sequence diers by one link from the
previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the
end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring
the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two
players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce the
formal denition of a farsighted improving path.
Denition 2. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g0 6= g
is a nite sequence of graphs g1;:::;gK with g1 = g and gK = g0 such that for any
k 2 f1;:::;K   1g either:
(i) gk+1 = gk   ij for some ij such that ui(gK) > ui(gk) or uj(gK) > uj(gk) or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that ui(gK) > ui(gk) and uj(gK)  uj(gk).
6If there exists a farsighted improving path from g to g0, then we write g ! g0.
For a given network g, let F(g) = fg0 2 G j g ! g0g. This is the set of networks
that can be reached by a farsighted improving path from g. Based on this notion of
farsighted improving path, we dene a network g to be pairwise farsightedly stable
(FS) if there is no farsighted improving path leaving g and there exists a farsighted
improving path from any other network leading to g. Formally,
Denition 3. A network g 2 G is pairwise farsightedly stable (FS) if:
(i) F(g) = ;, and
(ii) 8g0 2 G n g, g 2 F(g0).
Although the existence of a FS network is not guaranteed in general, the notion
of FS network has very nice properties as a predictive device for our experiment.
Indeed, when a FS network exists, it is the unique one (since F(g) = ; contradicts
condition (ii) in order to have another network g00 6= g being also FS) and it is pair-
wise stable (due to the fact that F(g) = ;). We are then restricting the analysis to
situations where farsightedness renes pairwise stability. Moreover, if a FS network
exists, it is consistent with other set-based notions of farsighted stability that have
been proposed in the literature. In particular, in case of existence the FS network
coincides with the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set6 (see Herings, Mauleon
and Vannetelbosch, 2009) and the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise far-
sightedly stable set (see Chwe, 1994).7 It is also contained by the largest pairwise
consistent set (see Chwe, 1994).8
6A set of networks G  G is pairwise farsightedly stable if (i) all possible pairwise deviations
from any network g 2 G to a network outside G are deterred by a credible threat of ending worse
o or equally well o, (ii) there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set
leading to some network in the set, and (iii) there is no proper subset of G satisfying Conditions (i)
and (ii).
7The set G  G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set if (i) there
is no farsighted improving path connecting any two networks in G and (ii) there is a farsighted
improving path from any network outside G to a network in G. Corollary 4 in Herings, Mauleon
and Vannetelbosch (2009) asserts that the set fgg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only
if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. Then, when a FS network
exists, it coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.
8A set G is a pairwise consistent set if both external and internal pairwise deviations are
deterred. The largest pairwise consisten set is the set that contains any pairwise consistent set.
7Dening farsighted behavior requires that every agent is farsighted and that this
is common knowledge. But when a farsighted agent observes a non-farsighted play
of another agent, we do not know exactly the kind of action the farsighted agent
will choose. Her action will depend, among others, on her beliefs about the others'
degree of farsightedness. A complete theoretical analysis of farsighted behavior with
heterogeneous agents goes far beyond the purpose of this paper. To dene farsighted
behavior for the purpose of this paper, note that a general pattern of farsighted
behavior can be easily identied. A farsighted agent should move towards the FS
network while believing it is reachable, and only change her strategy once convinced
that the best feasible stable solution is not the FS network.
Though the details of this heuristics must be adapted to the specic case, the
features that characterize it as farsighted are invariant. Its structure will consist
of the following elements: (i) at the beginning of the game a farsighted agent will
act as if everybody else is farsighted; (ii) given her (evolving) beliefs on her group
composition she will assess if there is a feasible path that goes to the FS network;
(iii) if at some t the group is not on this path she will target a dierent stable
network. In Section 4 we will specify such a heuristics more in detail in order to
estimate the portion of farsighted experimental subjects.
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 The game
We consider a simple dynamic link formation game, almost identical to that proposed
by Watts (2001). Time is a countable innite set: T = 0;1;:::;t;:::; gt denotes the
network that exists at the end of period t. The process starts at t = 0 with n = 4
unconnected players (g0 coincides with the empty network, g;). The players meet
over time and have the opportunity to form links with each other.
At every stage t > 0, a link ijt is randomly identied to be updated. At t = 1
each link from the set gN is selected with uniform probability. At every t > 1, a link
ij from the set gN n ijt 1 is selected with uniform probability. Thus, a link cannot
be selected twice in two consecutive stages. If the link ij 2 gt 1, then both i and
j can decide unilaterally to sever the link; if the link ij = 2 gt 1, then i and j can
form the link ij if they both agree. gt 1 is updated accordingly and we move to
8gt. All group members are informed about both the decisions taken by the players
involved in the selected link and the consequences on that link. They are informed
through a graphical representation of the current network gt and the associated
payos. After every stage all group members are asked whether they are satised
with the current network or not. If they unanimously declare they are satised,
the game ends; otherwise, they move to the next stage.9 To ensure that an end is
reached, a random stopping rule is added after stage 25: at every t  26 the game
ends anyway with probability 0.2.
The game is repeated three times to allow for learning: groups are kept the same
throughout the experiment. Group members are identied through a capital letter
(A, B, C or D). The identities are reassigned at every new repetition.
A vector of payos is associated to every network: it allocates a number of points
to each player in the network. The subjects receive points depending only on the
nal network of each repetition. Thus, their total points are given by the sum of
the points achieved in the nal networks of the three repetitions. At the end of the
experiment the points are converted into Euro at the exchange rate of 1 Euro = 6
points.
The subjects are informed about the payos associated to every possible network
and know the whole structure of the game from the beginning. Before starting
the rst repetition the participants have the opportunity of practicing the relation
between networks and payos and the functioning of the stages through a training
stage and three trial stages.
3.2 Predictions
Since n = 4, it follows that #gN = 6 and #G = 64.
Figure 1 displays the payos that were used in the experiment for each class
of networks. The function of material payos satises anonymity and then, this
representation is sucient to assign a payo to each player in each possible net-
work conguration. These numbers were chosen in order to provide the resulting
predictions with a set of nice properties that are described below.
9Subjects are informed about the outcome of the satisfaction choices - i.e. end of the repetition
or not - but not about individual choices.






































































































































Consider self-regarding agents (ui(g) = f(xi(g))). There are 6 PWS networks: g;,
gN and the four networks in class C5. Note that, in every network in C5, the
connected agents can improve their situation by cutting both of their links. These
networks (contrary to g; and gN) are not Nash stable in the terminology of Bloch
and Jackson (2006).10 In our experiment, all groups start at g;, and then groups
composed of myopic players are expected not to move from g;. This prediction is
robust to errors. Either a sequence of three links added consecutively by error and
leading to a network in C5, or a sequence of four links added consecutively by error11
is needed in order to change the prediction for myopic agents. In both cases, these
sequences of events are highly unlikely, and our prediction for a myopic group of
players is to end up in g;.
10Pairwise Nash stability is a renement of both pairwise stability and Nash stability, where one
requires that a network be immune to the formation of a new link by any two agents, and the
deletion of any number of links by any individual agent.
11In this last case, the players in the group may add the remaining links and end in gN.
10To identify the FS network, we need to compute F(g) for every g. We can prove
the following result.
Proposition 1. Consider payos as in Figure 1 and a set N of four self-regarding
agents. Then F(gN) = ; and gN 2 F(g0) for every g0 2 G n gN.
The proof of this proposition, as well as all other proofs, can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
Using the denition of a FS network we derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1. gN is the unique farsightedly stable network.
Hence, a group composed by farsighted agents will end up at gN. This prediction
is robust to errors in the sense that the farsighted prediction does not depend on the
starting point: from any other network g 6= gN, there is a farsighted improving path
leading to gN. Moreover, since F(gN) = ;, farsighted agents will stay at gN once it is
reached. Remember that the FS network is also PWS. Even myopic agents will stay
at the FS network once it is reached. Therefore, one cannot nd direct experimental
evidence against PWS as opposed to FS. But our experiment discriminates between
the dierent behavioral models that lie behind both stability concepts. In this way
our experiment can provide evidence in favor or against the farsighted models of
network formation in cases where they rene PWS.
The payos guarantee that the predicted networks are unique, both for the my-
opic and the farsighted behavior, and disjoint. Moreover, the predicted networks
are not strongly ecient in the sense of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)12 nor Pareto
dominant. Previous experimental studies have shown that eciency considerations
can drive individual's behavior (see Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). But eciency
arguments could not explain if gN or g; were observed in the experiment.
Up to now we have considered self-regarding agents. However, many experimen-
tal results show that subjects do not only care about their own payos, but also
about the payos of the other agents (for an overview, see Sobel, 2005). Our pre-
dictions also hold for social preferences. As an example, take the inequity model
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and assume that all agents are equally motivated by
inequity aversion. Let x = x1;x2;:::;xn be the vector of monetary payos. The






xi(g0) for all g0 2 G.
11utility function of player i is given by










maxfxi   xj;0g, (1)
with    and 0    1.
Proposition 2. For the network formation game with inequity averse agents, it
holds that (i) myopic agents will remain in the empty network, g;, and (ii) farsighted
agents will build the complete network, gN, for every    and 0    1.
3.3 Experimental procedures
The experiment took place at the EELAB of the University of Milan-Bicocca on
June 10th and 11th, 2010. The computerized program was developed using Z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We run 6 sessions with 24 subjects per session, for a total
of 144 participants and 36 groups. Participants were undergraduate students from
various disciplines,13 recruited through an announcement on the EELAB website.
Subjects were randomly assigned to individual terminals and were not allowed
to communicate during the experiment. Instructions were read aloud (see Appendix
C for an English translation of the instructions). Participants were asked to ll
in a control questionnaire; the experiment started only when all the subjects had
correctly completed the task.
Sessions took on average 90 minutes, including instructions, control and nal
questionnaire phases. Average payment was 16.10 Euro (no show up fee was paid)
with a minimum of 4.70 and a maximum of 22.70 Euro.
4 Results
We start by considering groups' nal networks. Table 1 classies groups with respect
to their nal network in each repetition (period). In the rst period around 40
percent of the groups reached gN. This percentage increased to 70 percent in the
second and third period. Less than 20 percent of the groups were consistent with
13Sociology, economics, business, psychology, statistics, computer science, law, biology, medecine,
mathematics, pedagogy and engineering.
12the myopic prediction in the last two periods.14 So a huge majority of the groups
formed the FS network. We also nd evidence of learning: the portion of groups
that displayed out-of-equilibrium behavior (category \None") decreased to around
10 percent of the sample in the last period. This result is rather striking since the
categories \Myopic" and \Farsighted" consisted of one specic network each, while
the residual category \None" covered 62 networks.
Table 1: Final networks: relative frequencies matching predictions
Period 1 2 3
Obs. 36 36 36
Myopic 0.28 0.14 0.19
Farsighted 0.42 0.70 0.70
None 0.30 0.16 0.11
Pearson's 2 1 13.33 10.12
LR test 1.01 14.55 11.46
 Signicant at the 0.01 level.
We use the Pearson's chi-square and the Likelihood Ratio test to determine
whether the relative frequencies of myopic and farsighted dier or not in the dierent
periods. While in period 1 there is no signicant dierence between numbers of
myopic and farsighted groups, in period 2 and 3 the dierences are signicant at the
0.01 level (see Table 1).
Table 2 replicates 1 without taking into account those groups that played for
more than 25 stages in one period. This is done in order to exclude groups that
played when the random stopping rule was in place, as it is dicult to assess the
stability of the nal network in those cases. Typically, the excluded groups either
did not end up in a stable network when they where stopped by the random stopping
rule (Category \None" in Table 1). Or they were stopped while being in the empty
network (\Myopic" in Table 1). In the last kind of groups, there is somebody
refusing to declare himself \satised", though the group has been in g; for many
stages without moving.
The results are qualitatively similar when comparing Table 2 and Table 1. The
14Except for one group in one single period, every other group moves from the empty network.
As a consequence we gather indirect evidence about the behavior of groups that do not start from
a PWS network.
13two main ndings - widespread and increasing consistency with predictions and
huge support for the farsighted one - are indeed strengthened. As shown in Table
2, dierences between the myopic and the farsighted relative frequency are now
signicant in all periods.
Table 2: Final networks:observations above stage 25 dropped
Period 1 2 3
Obs. 24 29 29
Myopic 0.21 0.07 0.17
Farsighted 0.62 0.86 0.83
None 0.17 0.07 0.00
Pearson's 2 5 19.59 12.45
LR test 5.23 23.17 13.53
 Signicant at the 0.05 level;  Signicant at the 0.01 level.
Tables 3 and 4 report the change in the outcome of individual groups from Period
1 to 2 and from Period 2 to 3, respectively. For example, take the row \Farsighted"
of Table 3. It shows that among the groups who reached the FS network in period
1, only 7 percent switched to the empty, myopic network in period 2, whereas 93
percent of the groups also reached the FS network in period 2. But among those
groups who ended up in the empty network in period 1, only 20 percent stayed at
the empty network in period 2, whereas 50 percent switched to the FS network, and
30 percent to an unstable network. Similarly, among the groups who ended up in
some other network in period 1, 55 percent of them switched to the FS network in
period 2, while only 18 percent of them switched to the empty network.
Table 3: Group ows: from Period 1 to Period 2
Period 2
Myopic Farsighted None
Myopic 0.20 0.50 0.30
Period 1 Farsighted 0.07 0.93 0.00
None 0.18 0.55 0.27
Total 0.45 1.98 0.57
14Table 4: Group ows: from Period 2 to Period 3
Period 3
Myopic Farsighted None
Myopic 0.60 0.00 0.40
Period 2 Farsighted 0.00 0.92 0.08
None 0.67 0.34 0.00
Total 1.27 1.26 0.48
Tables 3 and 4 show that groups that reached gN in a previous period are (almost)
always able to replicate the result: the Farsighted-Farsighted cell shows a fraction
above 90 percent in both tables. The other categories display greater mobility across
time. Some of them reach the complete network, others uctuate among the empty
network and the None category. On aggregate our results are unambiguous.
Result 1. Group behavior supports farsighted stability. Groups consistent with my-
opic behavior are less than 20 percent of the total. On aggregate, pairwise stability
accounts for up to 90 percent of the observations.15
We now turn to individual behavior. While myopic behavior is well dened and
provides a clear-cut prediction at every decision node, farsighted behavior depends
on the agents beliefs about others which in turns depend on the past play. We will
use as a proxy a decision rule of the kind discussed in Section 2. We have tested for
many dierent alternative denitions and the results have proved to be highly stable
among all of them. The results of these robustness checks are shown in Appendix
B.
An agent is attributed to be farsighted if she uses the following decision rule: (i)
start by adding all possible links; (ii) if at stage 20 the current network has less than
four links,16 revert to myopic behavior. Phrases in italics represent the parameters
manipulated in the robustness check (see Appendix B). This decision rule provides
a clear-cut prescription at every decision node.
Thus we can compare actual decisions to the benchmark of myopic and farsighted
behavior. Four cases arises from this comparison, distinguishing whether the actual
15Notice that both the empty network and the FS network are pairwise stable networks.
16When a four link network is reached, myopic and farsighted agents are all willing to add the
remaining links. This explains the choice of this threshold.
15choice is consistent (i) only with myopia, (ii) only with farsightedness, (iii) with
none of them or (iv) with both of them (ambiguous). We classify all single choices
according to those cases. The relative majority of the decisions is unambiguously
farsighted, and 78 percent of the decisions are not contradicting farsightedness.
To see whether a subject is myopic or farsighted (or none of the two) we have
to aggregate all the choices made by this individual. To do so, we use the following
criterion: (i) individual choices are categorized as above, (ii) choices consistent
with both myopia and farsightedness are disregarded, (iii) individuals are assigned
to category x if the absolute majority of their remaining choices falls in category x,
(iv) if an absolute majority is not present, the individual is Not classied. Step (ii)
is necessary if one wants to consider only the choices that can be clearly identied:
the Ambiguous class is not a proper category as it collects choices that cannot be
classied.17
Table 5: Individuals: relative frequencies per period and on aggregate
Obs: 144 1 2 3 Overall
Myopic 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.06
Farsighted 0.57 0.76 0.80 0.75
None 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.01
Not Classied 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.18
We implement this procedure for each single period and on the whole vector of
individual choices. The corresponding results are shown in Table 5. We are able
to classify from around 68 percent of the participants in the rst period to around
90 percent in the third. Aggregate results show that only 1 percent of the subjects
behave systematically against both myopia and farsighted prescriptions. Only 7
percent of the individuals behave myopically, whereas three quarters of them are
consistent with farsightedness. The dierence is huge and it holds across all the
three periods. We nd evidence of individual learning: the fraction of farsighted
agents increases steadily, while the fraction of myopic agents decreases from the
rst to the second period and increases in the last.
Table 6 shows how the composition of groups inuences the observed outcome.
Take as an example the column \Myopic". On average groups reaching the Myopic
17An alternative way would be to retain those choices and classify individuals according to
relative majority. The results of this procedure are qualitatively identical to the ones reported.
16Table 6: Average group compositions
Group nal outcome:
N of subjects of type: Myopic Farsighted Other
Myopic 1.23 0.05 0.29
Farsighted 1.40 3.54 2.19
None 0.60 0.06 0.52
Not classied 0.77 0.35 1.00
network consist of 1.23 myopic individuals, 1.40 farsighted ones, 0.60 individuals
whose behavior is not consistent with either myopic or farsighted behavior, and 0.77
subjects that cannot be classied. Groups that reached the FS network consist on
average of 3.54 farsighted individuals, and of a negligible number (0.05) of myopic
ones. These patterns of group composition indicate that: (i) more than three players
are needed to reach the complete network for sure; (ii) slightly more than one myopic
agent is sucient to make the group consistent with the myopic prediction; (iii) more
mixed groups have a higher chance of being stuck somewhere in between.
The presence of a small number of myopic agents was able to drive the results
of a signicant fraction of groups. Moreover, the presence of farsighted agents in
myopic groups accounts for the fact that only one group remained in the empty
network from the beginning. Summing up:
Result 2. Individual behavior strongly rejects myopia for a vast majority of the
subjects; 3 out of 4 participants are found consistent with farsightedness. One myopic
participant can be sucient to enforce a myopic outcome for the entire group.
5 Conclusion
This paper reports an experimental test of the behavioral assumptions underlying
the most used stability notions for network formation. In particular we test whether
subjects behave myopically or farsightedly when forming a network. As far as we
know this is the rst experimental investigation into this issue.
Our results strongly reject the hypothesis of myopic behavior both at the group
and at the individual level. Behaviors consistent with farsightedness account for
75 percent of the individual observations. Consequently, about 60 percent of the
17groups reach the farsighted stable network on aggregate. This share increases to 70
percent as the game is repeated, and of those groups that stopped before stage 25
even 83 percent reached the farsighted stable network in the last period.
A conservative account of our results suggests that farsighted stability is a valu-
able renement concept when among the pairwise stable networks there are far-
sightedly stable ones. However, the behavioral model underlying pairwise stability
is strongly rejected. This opens the way to new interesting research questions, in
particular related to those cases where farsighted stability provides predictions that
are not pairwise stable.
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Proof of Proposition 1. To avoid reporting the farsighted improving path for
each single network, let gi be a generic network in class Ci and ci  Ci a generic
proper subset of the corresponding class. We will write gi ! g; g 2 Cj and gi ! g;
g 2 cj, when the generic network gi in class Ci reaches with a farsighted improving
path all the networks in class Cj or only a proper subset cj of Cj, respectively. The
list of farsighted improving paths among the networks in G is the following:
F(g;) = fg j g 2 C10 [ C11g
F(g2) = fg j g 2 C1 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g3) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ c5 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g4) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ c5 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g5) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g6) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ c4 [ c5 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g7) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ c3 [ c4 [ C5 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g8) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ c4 [ C5 [ c7 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g9) = fg j g 2 C1 [ c2 [ c4 [ c5 [ c6 [ c7 [ C10 [ C11g
F(g10) = fg j g 2 c2 [ c4 [ c5 [ c6 [ C11g
F(gN) = ;.
It follows that gN 2 F(g), for all g in G n gN and F(gN) = ;, which corresponds to
our denition of FS network. We know that this network is the unique FS network.
Proof of Proposition 2. Result (i) derives from the notion of pairwise stability.We
know that g; is pairwise stable if  = 0 and  = 0. To simplify notation, let xik be
the monetary payo of player i in network gk and uik the corresponding utility.
It is immediate to note that uik  xik for any gk. Now, uik = xik;8i, for every   
and 0    1 if gk = g;. Thus, it follows from the denition that g; is pairwise
stable for every    and 0    1. Since the experiment starts at g;, myopic
agents will not move.
For result (ii), recall the denition of farsighted improving paths and of farsight-
edly stable network.
We know that gN is the unique farsightedly stable network if  = 0 and  = 0
(i.e., when uik = xik;8i, 8gk). Now, for every    and 0    1, we have that
uik  xik, 8i, 8gk, and uik = xik, 8i, if gk = gN.
21Thus, if g ! gN for some  and , then g ! gN for every 0   and 
0  . Hence,
since gN 2 F(g) for any g 2 G n gN for  =  = 0, we also have that gN 2 F(g) for
any g 2 G n gN for every    and 0    1.
There is no immediate way to show analytically that F(gN) = ; for every    and
0    1, whenever F(gN) = ; for  =  = 0. However we can prove it numeri-
cally for our payos, simulating the resulting utilities and corresponding farsighted
improving paths for the set of admissible parameters.
A.2 Other denitions of farsighted behavior
We present here the robustness check for dierent proxies of farsighted behavior.
The general decision rule prescribes to form all possible links at the beginning and
to revert to a dierent behavior if, at a certain stage, some specic class of networks
is not reached.
Table 7: Parameters identifying farsighted behavior (changes in bold)
Name When Why What
Basis 20 Less than four links Myopic behavior
Why 20 No connected star network Myopic behavior
or less than four links
When 1 15 Less than four links Myopic behavior
When 2 p1:20, p2,p3:15 Less than four links Myopic behavior
What 20 Less than four links Break all links
As discussed in Section 3, there are three parameters in the farsighted decision
rule that can be manipulated: (i) when the turning point may occur (up to which
stage one tries to build links); (ii) why it may occur: which is the reference class of
networks; (iii) what behavior to take: try to get back to the `safe' empty network
or behave myopically.
Table 7 reports on the dierent parametrizations used. Table 8 report the corre-
sponding results. The results are not sensible to the specic decision rule. Any rule
consistent with the general prescription leads to the same conclusions.
22Table 8: Individuals: relative frequencies for dierent parameteres
Obs: 144 Basis Why When 1 When 2 What
Myopic 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06
Farsighted 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.77
None 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00
Ambiguous 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17
A.3 Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in decision-making. In this experiment you can earn
money. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions you and other
participants make. Please read these instructions carefully. In the experiment you
will earn points. At the end of the experiment we will convert the points you have
earned into euros according to the rate: 6 points equal 1 Euro. You will be paid
your earnings privately and condentially after the experiment. Throughout the
experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants
in any way. If you have a question please raise your hand. One of us will
come to your desk to answer it.
Groups
 At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign you -
and all other participants - to a group of 4 participants. Group compositions
do not change during the experiment. Hence, you will be in the same group
with the same people throughout the experiment.
 The composition of your group is anonymous. You will not get to know the
identities of the other people in your group, neither during the experiment nor
after the experiment. The other people in your group will also not get to know
your identity.
 Each participant in the group will be assigned a letter, A, B, C, or D, that
will identify him. On your computer screen, you will be marked `YOU' as well
as with your identifying letter (A, B, C or D). You will be marked with your
identifying letter (A, B, C or D) on the computer screens of the other people
in your group.
23 Those identifying letters will be kept xed within the same round, but will be
randomly reassigned at the beginning of every new round.
Length and articulation of the experiment
 The experiment consists of 3 rounds, each divided into stages.
 The number of stages in each round will depend on the decisions you and the
other people in your group make.
 After a round ends, the following will start, with the same rules as the previous:
actions taken in one round do not aect the subsequent rounds.
General rules: rounds, stages, formation and break of links
 In each round the task is to form and break links with other members of the
group.
 You will have the possibility to link with any other participant in your group.
That is, you can end up with any number of links (0, 1, 2 or 3).
 Thus, the number of links that can be formed in your group will be a number
between 0 and 6 (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The set of links that exist in your group
at the same time is called a network.
 Your group starts the rst stage of every round with zero links.
 In every stage a network of links is formed, based on your and the other group
participants decisions. This network is called the current network.
 Your group will enter a new stage with the links that exist in the network that
is formed in the previous stage, according to the following linking rules
Stage rules
 In each stage the computer will select for each group a single link among the
six possible at random. A link cannot be selected twice in two consecutive
stages.
24 The participants involved in that link will be asked to take a decision in that
stage, the others will be informed about the selected link and will be asked to
wait for others' decisions.
 If this link does not exist at the beginning of the stage, the decision will be
whether to form that link or not. If this link exists at the beginning of the
stage, the decision will be whether to keep or to break that link.
 Thus, in each stage at most one link can be formed or broken.
Stopping rules
 After every stage you and the other people in your group will be asked if the
current network is satisfactory to you. You can answer YES or NO.
 If ALL the people in your group answer YES the round ends and the points
associated to the current network are considered to compute your earnings.
 If at least one person in your group answers NO, the group moves to the next
stage.
 After stage 25 a random stopping rule is added. In this case, even if you or any
of the other people in your group are not satised with the current network,
the round will end with probability 0.2.
Earnings
 To every participant in every network is associated a number of points.
 You will receive points according to the network that exists in your group at
the end of each round.
 Your total earnings will be the sum of the earnings in each of the 3 rounds.
 Thus, the points associated to the networks you and the other people in your
group form at every stage, except for the last of each round, are not considered
for the computation of your earnings.
 You are always informed about the points associated to the current network
on screen. On the top of your screen, you are always informed of the points
you earned in the previous rounds.
25 You can learn about the points associated to every other network through
the points sheet you nd attached to the instructions. It displays the points
associated to every class of networks:
{ In every network, the black dots are the participants in the group; the
lines are the existing links.
{ Every class of network is characterized by the number of links each par-
ticipant has.
{ The numbers close to every black dots indicate the number of points
a person with that number of links is earning in that specic class of
networks.
 An example will clarify the relation between network and points and the de-
veloping of the experiment. You will also practice through a training stage.
Concluding remarks
You have reached the end of the instructions. It is important that you understand
them. If anything is unclear to you or if you have questions, please raise your
hand. To ensure that you understood the instructions we ask you to answer a few
control questions. After everyone has answered these control questions correctly the
experiment will start.
Control questionnaire
This questionnaire is intended to verify that everybody have understood the in-
structions. You will not be evaluated according to the answers you give. Once you
complete the questionnaire, please, raise your hand and one of the experimenters
will come to you to check your answers. In the following we will write ab to denote
the link between participants A and B (and so on).
1. Network 1 includes the links ac and bc. Network 2 includes the links ac, ad, bd,
and cd. Please draw both networks and ll in with the corresponding points
for each participant.
















A : ::: B : ::: C : ::: D : :::
2. The current network consists of the link bd. The link ac is selected. A chooses
FORM, C chooses NOT FORM.
Is the link formed?
Can you please write down the points for each participant in the resulting
network?
A:... B:... C:... D:...
3. The current network consists of the links ac, bd and cd. The link ac is selected.
A chooses KEEP, C chooses KEEP. Can you please write down the points for
each player in the resulting network?
A:... B:... C:... D:...
4. A, B, C, and D all declare that they are satised with the current network,
after stage 5. This consists of links ab and bd. How many stages will the round
last?
How much Euro will each participant earn in that round?
A:... B:... C:... D:...
5. If, at the same point as in question 4, A declared she wasn't satised, how
many stages would at least the round last?
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